Normativity is an exciting new philosophical topic concerning the meaning of the norms that pervade our lives. The debate about normativity concerns whether these norms are a part of the intrinsic fabric of reality, or imposed by human activity. In this project, I bring Richard Rorty into the current debate about normativity to help create an argument against normativism. As Rorty’s foil, I appeal to Robert Brandom, who I characterize as a paradigmatic normativist. This is an interesting pairing as both figures hold many complimentary views, but I begin by discussing the concession Rorty makes to Bjorn Ramberg concerning normativity in Rorty and His Critics. I unpack this by discussing the relationship between Davidson’s philosophy and Rorty’s, and proceed to discuss the similarities and differences between their views, pertaining to normativity, before engaging Brandom as well. My argument is that while construing Rorty as a normativist is tenable, it requires a disingenuous and selective reading of Rorty. In order to preserve many of the features that make Rorty exciting and relevant, I argue that he should not be faulted for failing to be a normativist. Rather, I argue that normativism is a disconcerting reactionary development. Reading Rorty as a normativist would do much to undermine what Rorty’s career was all about. I provide a response to Brandom’s on Rorty’s behalf.